Now this: Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr plans to announce Friday that he will disarm his Mahdi Army, which was raining mortars on Baghdad’s Green Zone as recently as April. Coupled with the near-total defeat of al Qaeda in Iraq, this means the U.S. no longer faces any significant organized military foe in the country. It also marks a major setback for Iran, which had used the Mahdi Army as one of its primary vehicles for extending its influence in Iraq.
Yeah. Along with the Badr Brigades, which now control the official organized Iraqi military.
Sadr’s relationship with Iran is unclear. Starting in 2003, there were reports that Iran’s intelligence service and Revolutionary Guards were funneling at least some help to Sadr, but it seems that most of Iran’s covert energy is going to support the SCIRI-Badr forces. And Iran seems quite content to build up its power and influence among Iraq’s current crop of Shiite rulers. Sadr, meanwhile, appears to be headed in the direction of a tactical alliance with the Sunni-led resistance—which won’t exactly endear him to Iran’s theocracy.
It seems entirely beyond the “strategic” understanding of western observers and analysts to comprehend that Iran might have backed two pro-Iranian forces in Iraq, and that Sadr is, compared to the Badr Organization, the lesser of the two threats.

